There are not, it would seem, too many lawyers who have an understanding o f t h e t e c h n i c a l me a n i n g o f t h e t e r m " o d i o u s d e b t s " . Ne v e r t h e l e s s , t h i s doctrine -if doctrine it can be called, which is highly dubious (but to keep matters simple it will be called a doctrine in what follows) -has almost explosive potential for many lender States in this world. A mere glance at the Internet under this catchword makes it clear why: literally dozens of NGOs go on record there claiming that States like Iraq are debt-free -not because the lender States should show mercy after the ousting of Saddam H u s s e i n , b u t f o r p u r e l y l e g a l r e a s o n s . " Od i o u s d e b t s " a r e u n d e rstood as a legal institution which, by force of law, renders certain debts automatically null and void. 1 T h e " o d i o u s d e b t s " d o c t r i n e i s l i t t l e mo r e t h a n 100 years old. Since it has been topical only sporadically over this period, it is unclear whether or not it alread y h a s t h e p r e c i s i o n o r " ma r g i n a l s h a r pn e s s " n e e d e d f o r i t t o b e u s e d as a legal instrument. This uncertainty, in turn, makes it appear very versatile in the way in which it can be used. In particular, the value judgement inherent in the terminology tends to mislead one into exploiting the doctrine to attempt to render morally repugnant facts legally null and void. In view of this, it is the (thankless) task of the legal scholar to call for caution in drawing conclusions of this sort (however understandable in human terms), and to highlight the distinction between law and morals, 2 a distinction that represents a hard-won victory in legal history and one for which we should be grateful.
SACK, " L e s e f f e t s d e s t r a n s f o r ma t i o n s d e s E t a t s s u r l e u r s dettes publiques et autres obligations fin a n c i è r e s " , Recueil Sirey, Paris (1927) . IDEM, La succession aux dettes publ i q u e s d ' E t a t , 70 (1929). creditors were aware of this, the granting of the loan represents a hostile act against the people of the debtor State, which renders the debt " o d io u s " a n d t h u s i n v a l i d .
Sack is widely regarded as the academic who has made the most indepth study of the issue of what happens to national debts after a change of regime. 5 H e i s s t i l l i n s o me wa y s t h e " c r o wn p r i n c e " o f a d v o c a t e s of this legal principle. Recently, however, a Canadian study has taken his arguments one step further. 6 I t s a u t h o r s s u g g e s t t h a t t h e " o d i o u sn e s s " o f a national debt should be determined not only on the basis of the two criteria advanced by Sack (i.e. use of the funds to the detriment of and against the best intere s t s o f t h e S t a t e , a n d t h e l e n d e r ' s a wa r e n e s s that this is the case), but that a third, objective, criterion should be added -to wit, that the debts must have been taken out without the consent of the population.
Before that, in the early 1980s, the International Law Commission had attempted to craft a definition in the process of developing the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts (4 April 1983):
Article 31: F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h e p r e s e n t a r t i c l e s , " o d i o u s d e b t s " me a n s : ( a ) a l l debts contracted by the predecessor State with a view to attaining objectives contrary to the major interests of the successor State or of the transferred territory; (b) all debts contracted by the predecessor State with an aim and for a purpose not in conformity with international law and, in particular, the p r i n c i p l e s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w e mb o d i e d i n t h e Ch a r t e r o f t h e U n i t e d Na t i o n s . " 7 However, not only was the article not inserted into the text of the Convention, but the Convention itself never entered into force. 8 To wind up this brief historical outline, it may be asserted that these lines of thought and reasoning leave too great a vacuum in theory and in practice for us to accept the princ i p l e o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " a s a l e g a l institution recognised under customary law. 9 For this, the principle would need to have been applied over a longer period, and it would need to be recognised as a legal obligation. 10 5 See, e.g., FEILCHENFELD, Public Debts and State Succession (1931) . See also FISCHER-LESCANO (supra note 3). On customary law from the point of view of international law as a whole, see TOMUSCHAT, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w: E n s u r i n g t h e S u r v i v a l o f Ma n k i n d o n t h e E v e o f a Ne w Ce n t u r y " , H a g u e A c a d e my o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w, Collected Courses 281 (1999), 324 ff.
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See SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN / STEIN, Völkerrecht, 10 th ed. (2000), Rz. 467.
Original purpose
The two practical examples given above in Section (A) were retrospective. The outcome could not have been foreseen by the two parties to the loan agreement when the loan was originally granted. This means that (from a European legal standpoint) an essential prerequisite of law is not met -i.e. the tenet that the law should act as an instrument to steer the behaviour of actors.
It is true that this is not enough by itself to call into question the legal validity of these measures, since customary law, in particular -that is to say, a generally accepted source of law -is characterised precisely by the fact that somewhere, at some point in time, a new legal understanding emerges which over time becomes so convincing that it becomes an integral part of the general sense of justice. We have not yet reached this point, however, wi t h r e s p e c t t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " . E v e n i f n o 100% agreement is needed to achieve this level of acceptance, neither is it enough for a few small groups to be persuaded of the legal validity of a concept for it to become accepted as customary law.
The purpose today
The direct purpose o f t h e " d o c t r i n e o f o d i o u s d e b t s " a s s e t o u t i n t h e t e r ms of reference for this study is to create the sort of impact that would steer the behaviour of the relevant actors. Like a signal, it should remind the parties involved in future loan agreements to respect the limits of private autonomy ( " Privatautonomie" ) s e t b y t h e n e w l e g a l p r i n c iple.
This doctrine would thus take its place among other, existing legal mechanisms -in particular under private and constitutional law -that serve as protection against over-hasty and therefore irresponsible commitment on the part of a State. 11 Both constitutional and civil law as a rule clearly state the formalities with which a country must comply before entering into a financial commitment of this kind. If these are flouted, which it would appear is the case more often than not, such commitments generally have
11
The question as to whether or not a legal principle of this sort is an instrument of international, public or civil law is of more technical interest, and we will not go into the issue in any more depth here. See REINISCH, State Responsibility for Debts: International Law Aspects of External Debt and Debt Restructuring (1995). no legally binding impact, even in private law. 12 An " o d i o u s d e b t s " d o c t r i n e would not add any more serious or incisive form of invalidity -except perhaps for stronger moral condemnation openly expressed.
An y l e g a l l y r e c o g n i s e d d o c t r i n e o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " wo u l d t h u s o n l y come into play over and above the (long-standing) legal instruments already in use. Since the doctrine would be used to enforce certain moral values, an attempt would have to be made to reach global agreement on these. The simple fact of the matter is that here, as elsewhere, the values praised by one appear unacceptable to another. Considerations pertaining to such clarification (or even discussion) have no place in a legal study, however, so we will simply assert that the goals o f h a v i n g t h e " o d ious d e b t s " d o c t r i n e a c c e p t e d a s a l e g a l p r i n c i p l e mu s t surely be to leave a dictatorial regime high and dry in material terms, and so foster more democratic forms of government, the only guarantee for potential lenders at the planning stage that their outlay will be repaid, as the variations of the " o d i o u s d e b t s " d o c t r i n e p r oposed thus far make abundantly clear.
C. -" ODIOUS DEBTS" : PRO AND CONTRA
Whatever the finer details of these objectives, we must examine in legal terms the pros and cons of introducing (or establishing) this doctrine.
Contra
The crucial and most obvious argument against establishing the doctrine of " o d io u s d e b t s " i s t h e b a s i c l e g a l p r i n c i p l e o f " pacta sunt servanda" ( p a c t s must be respected). This ancient principle is not based on inflexible and stubborn legal thinking, but on the recognition of the value of a firm basis for planning, not only for the economy as a whole but in interpersonal d e a l i n g s i n g e n e r a l , a s we l l . E v e n i f t h e " i n v e n t i o n " o f t h e c o ntract per se is not necessarily the result of such a need for future security or security in some form, the binding nature of a contract once entered into is a matter of top (personal) and economic interest. We should not lose sight of the fact that any incursions into this security will trigger a response on the part of the party affected which ought to be taken into account before any pertinent new legal principle is introduced.
In the case at hand, the response might well be a dramatic drop in the willingness of potential lenders to grant loans. We could, of course, counter that this is precisely what we are after (see Section B.II) --to make it 12 There are, of course, de facto problems in obtaining legally binding confirmation that contracts of this sort are null and void, and even greater difficulties involved in stipulating the legal consequences of a decision of this nature. impossible for certain States or governments to borrow money. However plausible this argument might appear at first sight, and disregarding for the moment the fate of the population (i.e. of each individual citizen) affected, its consequences reach far and wide. It may be morally repugnant to lend money to a generally abhorred dictator, but what about the loans granted t o t h a t d i c t a t o r ' s p e r f e c t l y h o n o u r a b l e p r e d e c e s s o r 13 that fall due under the dictatorship? And who is to set the yardstick for what is to be deemed " g e n e r a l l y a bh o r r e d " ? An d wh a t h a p p e n s i f a H e a d o f g o vernment with a hitherto unblemished reputation suddenly turns bad during his period in office? Should a sort of black list be drawn up of endangered countries? 14 The list of questions of this nature could easily be continued. However, t h e e x a mp l e s g i v e n a r e s u f f i c i e n t i n d i c a t i o n t h a t a d o c t r i n e o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " wo u l d i mp l y t h e p o l i t icisation and moralisation of legal considerations, which would beyond doubt make it more difficult to borrow money in many cases and preclude it entirely in others. Clearly, this cannot be the overall desired effect, since the populations of the countries affected would then bear the brunt of the changes. If the aim is not to introduce any across-the-board bans on lending but to condemn, on a one-off basis, as legally untenable those loans or parts of loans that fall into t h e c a t e g o r y o f " o d i o u s " , t h e n a t t h e v e r y l e a s t l e n d e r s ' c o s t s wi l l b e c o me considerably higher since they will be required to monitor the actions of their borrowers much more closely. Lenders would not be able to waive t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r e s c h e wi n g " o d i o u s d e b t s " s i mp l y b y i n c o r p orating a provision in their lending agreements to the effect that the funds are to be used for a generally accepted purpose. Consequently, if the cost of monitoring borrowers rises, so will the cost of borrowing. This in turn will make borrowing prohibitively expensive for some countries and severely restrict the borrowing capacities of others, thus potentially at least worsening the living conditions of the entire population.
Pro
At the other end of the spectrum, we must remember that the principle of " pacta sunt servanda" , h e l d i n s u c h h i g h e s t e e m f o r t housands of years, is 13 I t i s mo r e t h a n j u s t a h i s t o r i c a l f o o t n o t e t h a t t h e t e r m " d i c t a t o r " h a s i t s o r i g i n s i n t h e ancient Roman Republic where this office was regarding as salvation in a desperate situation: see, e.g., KUNKEL / SCHERMAIER, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 13 th ed. (2001) currently prone to erosion all of the world. In civil law terms, we need but point to the consumer protection law that has been developing over the last 40 years or so. One of its main achievements has been to make it significantly easier to rescind a contract, thus making serious inroads into the binding nature of contracts.
While it is true that this comparison is not entirely apt, given that consumers play no part in the borrowing sector under scrutiny here, and that consumer protection law usually exc l u d e s " n o n -c o n s u me r s " f r o m i t s scope of application, it still must be mentioned since calls for the r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e " o d i o u s d e b t s " d o c t r i n e s e e m a l mo s t e n t i r e l y t o b e based on a de facto power gap between lender and borrower (or at least between lender and the population of the borrowing State). Given that g l o b a l i s a t i o n i s t u r n i n g o u r wo r l d i n t o a " g l o b a l v i l l a g e " wh e r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law is increasingly moving into areas hitherto the prerogative of civil law, 15 the parallel between consumer protection under civil and international law no longer appears quite so unthinkable.
E q u a l l y , t h e " e r o s i o n " o f t h e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e o f " pacta sunt servanda" i s beginning to tell in international law. It is no coincidence that here too (although so far in very few isolated cases only) the principle of democracy, which is enshrined in international public law, is being taken as grounds to justify the cancelling of long-standing contracts although no reason exists to terminate them under either the agreed contract terms or other valid legal provisions. 16 In view of these findings, we must conclude that the introduction of a legally binding doct r i n e o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " i s n o t a u t o ma t i c a l l y c o n d e mn e d to failure on the ground that contracts once concluded must be honoured. In view of the erosion of the binding nature of this principle that may be observed in many areas of the law worldwide, another exception to this basic principle would not however imply a fundamental rejection of the traditional principle.
D. -APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEM
Summing up the findings so far, we may state the following. The doctrine of
" o d i o u s d e b t s " h a s n o t y e t a c h i e v e d t h e s t a t u s o f c u s t o ma r y l a w. I t s 15
Suffice it to mention the discussion on the introduction of a State insolvency law; see PAULUS, " A S t a t u t o r y P r o c e e d i n g f o r R e s t r u c t u r i n g De b t s o f S o v e r e i g n S t a t e s " , Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) (2003), 401 ff.; cf. also VAGTS, " S o v e r e i g n B a n k r u p t c y : I n r e Germa n y " ( 1953) , " I n r e I r a q " ( 2004 introduction would serve the goal (inter alia) of undermining the material basis of dictatorships and fostering democratisation worldwide; it would doubtlessly make it more difficult to borrow money, but it would not entail any fundamental break with existing law.
If we take these as the starting conditions for any doctrine of " o d i o u s d e b t s " i n wh a t e v e r f o r m, we mu s t t h e n l o o k a t t h e f i n e r p o i n t s . Wh a t f o r m should the doctrine take, or how should it be formulated in legal terms, in order to achieve the intended objectives? The answer to this involves two steps. First, we must look at the approaches proposed to date and second, we must devise our own proposal.
Response (ad hoc)

T h e c a s e s i n wh i c h t h e d o c t r i n e o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " h a s b e e n i n v o k e d t o d a t e
(Cuba, Costa Rica) are, from a legal point of view, particularly unfortunate c a s e s o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f " l a w" . B y d e c i d i n g r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y o n t h e l e g a l nullity of the debts, they preclude the steering impact of law discussed in Section B.I. If it is uncertain ex ante whether or not the sword of Damocles of legal unenforceability is merely hanging over the sum lent, or whether it might actually fall, the foundation for the costing of loans begins to wobble. If the sword falls, the lender must bear the risk that the borrower might not conform to the norms of acceptable and accepted behaviour. At best, this situation may perhaps appear as morally justified preferential treatment for the population thus freed from the yoke of its debts, but it is difficult in legal terms to reconcile it with a basic sense of justice.
At this juncture we must, however, add a qualification. The idea of the law as a steering instrument can be put into practice in various ways. In Germany, for instance, it takes a different form from that adopted in the United States of America. Whereas in Germany, the legislator is held responsible for ensuring security in planning, which means that the feasible path to be taken must be laid down ex ante and in great detail, the prevalent philosophy in the United States is that individuals are free to wheel and deal as they please, but that in so doing they accept the risk that some court might at some point in time brand this (past) wheeling and dealing as illegal. 17 So what would appear untenable in Germany is the expression of a fundamental understanding of liberty in the USA. See, e.g., CARRINGTON, " P u n i t i v e Da ma g e s -The American Tradition of P r i v a t e L a w" , i n : Humboldt Forum Recht, <www.humboldt-forum-recht.de/7-2004>.
Prevention (ex ante)
Having looked at these premises, it would thus appear preferable from a German point of view to develop preventive criteria for the doctrine of " o d i o u s d e b t s " a s i t i s t o b e a p p l i e d i n f u t u r e .
The new proposal
(a) The approach adopted in the new proposal is in line with the Canadian study mentioned supra (Section A, footnote 6). It ext e n d s S a c k ' s criteria, positing three conditions which, if met, would render a debt null and void and effectively free the borrower from its obligation to repay the loan. The three conditions are: lack of consent on the part of the people, loan not in the interests of the peop l e , a n d t h e l e n d e r ' s f o r e -knowledge of these two facts.
(b) Two positive aspects of this proposal jump to the fore. In pinp o i n t i n g " c r e d i t o r a wa r e n e s s " , i t s t a n d s o u t f r o m q u i t e a f e w o f t h e schemes and ideas advanced by some NGOs, which tend simply to ignore this stipulation (intentionally or unintentionally). 18 Clearly, this is a mistake, and although we might feel that there is no need not labour the point, we s h o u l d s t r e s s f o r c l a r i t y ' s s a k e t h a t i t wo u l d b e e x t r e me l y u n j u s t , f r o m t h e point of view of all precepts of justice in the civilised world, to foist on a lender, merely because it is a lender, the risk that the loans it makes might be put to some inappropriate use. That risk can only be attributed to a lender if it can be subjectively held responsible for the odious use to which the money is put.
The other positive facet of the proposal is that it does not focus on the criterion of a change of regime, as was the case in both Cuba and Costa Rica and was more or less explicitly taken as a major contributory ground or a p p e a r e d t o p l a y a ma j o r r o l e i n S a c k ' s p r o p o s a l s . Wh i l e t h i s mi g h t p l a y a n important de facto role in ensuring that existing commitments are honoured -f o r wh a t d i c t a t o r , h o we v e r r u t h l e s s , wo u l d i n v o k e t h e d o c t r i n e o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " t o p l e a d t h a t h i s d e b t s we r e n u l l a n d v o i d , k n o wi n g t h a t h e wi l l himself need to borrow at regular intervals in the future? -in legal terms, we must alwa y s v i e w t h e " o d i o u s n e s s " , wh i c h e v e r wa y we c h o o s e t o d e f i n e i t , independently of and separate from any such changes of regime or government. The mere fact of a change taking place does not make the funds previously borrowed and used more odious. Change per se does not increase the burden of guilt of an odious dictator. (c) At the same time, however, the criteria set out in the Canadian proposal must be censured for being too vague and hence difficult to quantify.
(1) If the people need to give their consent, application of the doctrine must surely be excluded wherever a democratically elected government is in power. Whether this circumstance, or its opposite, genuinely and sufficiently limits the target group would seem questionable. First, we must ask ourselves how we should proceed in the case of a mock democracy, where the government falsely claims legitimacy through a p o p u l a r v o t e , a s i n " t r u e " d e mo c r a c i e s . S e c o n d , mo n o c r a c i e s automatically fail to pass this test: monarchs or the spiritual leaders of a religious State would thus, by virtue of the way in which their nation was structured, be branded odious, thereby making it more difficult and hence, more expensive, for them to borrow money.
This brings us to the underlying and truly fundamental questionnamely, who should define who is a dictator under the terms of the doctrine o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " ? T h i s i s a n e xtremely delicate question that cannot be answered using the yardstick of existing law, or indeed existing philosophy. T h e r e p l y : " a n y g o v e r n me n t t h a t i s n o t l eg i t i ma t e d b y t h e p e o p l e " i s i n n o way sufficiently precise to be acceptable.
(2) The other objective criterion used in the Canadian proposalabsence of benefit -suffers the same shortcomings. Who is to provide the y a r d s t i c k a g a i n s t wh i c h " b e n e f i t " i s t o b e me a s u r e d ? T h i s i s i mp o r t a n t i n both factual and temporal terms: in factual terms, because it must be possible to give an ex ante definition of what serves the interests of the population and what does not. There are no blanket answers to this question, however. Weapons purchases, for instance (to take a particularly controversial example) are only discreditable because of the individual circumstances that accompany them -i.e. if they are to be used in an unjustified war of aggression or for other criminal purposes, but not if they a r e n e e d e d f o r t h e c o u n t r y ' s o wn d e f e n c e . Or , t o t a k e a n o t h e r e x a mp l e , funds might be used to install a repressive grid of prisons, but who is to say how many prisons serve the p e o p l e ' s i n t e r e s t a n d h o w ma n y a r e e x c e s s i v e and hence no longer to their advantage? Nobody would seriously suggest that a country should not be allowed to build any prisons at all. Doubts are justified in the other direction too, however. The construction of schools and hospitals is generally considered to be in the p e o p l e ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t s . B u t wh a t h a p p e n s i f t h e s e s c h o o l s a n d h o spitals r e ma i n t h e s o l e p r e r o g a t i v e o f t h e r i c h , o r o f t h e r u l e r ' s o wn f a mi l y ? T h e question, to put it succinctly, is: who are th e " p e o p l e " , a n d wh o s h o u l d represent them?
This brings us to the temporal aspect. At which point in time should the " b e n ef i t " b e a s s e s s e d -at the time of lending or when the decision is made as to whether or not the debt is odious? From a legal standpoint, it only makes sense to look at the time of lending -otherwise lenders would be expected to shoulder a monitoring function, which clearly they would either be unable to do or which would make the loan prohibitively expensive.
(3) Finally, the subjective c r i t e r i o n o f " c r e d i t o r a wa r en e s s " mu s t a l s o b e a r i t s s h a r e o f c r i t i c i s m. Wh i l e e s s e n t i a l , t h e l e n d e r ' s p o s i t i v e k n o wl e d g e cannot be made the fulcrum or the doctrine would be all too easy to circumvent. If it is to be to any real degree applicable in practice, the subjective yardstick must be worded more precisely, for instance, by stipulating that positive knowledge is to be regarded on a par with ignorance resulting from gross negligence.
Lex mercatoria
While we must concede that the above criticism appears to imply that it is possible to achieve greater precision, it is also true that, for the time being at least, this will be no easy task, considering that we have got little further than to consider the structure of a statutory definition. Having said this, though, we can attempt to come closer to an appropriate solutionand do so without departing too much from what we have dealt with so far. It is particularly helpful to base our work on existing models, the legal character of which is unquestionable. This allows us to contemplate a set of regulations which can lay claim to worldwide acceptance, or which can at least be regarded as the lex mercatoria 19 complied with -the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 20 Courts in many countries are increasingly relying on these Principles in judging international contracts when it is not entirely clear which legal system should be applied. 21 See BONELL, " UNIDROIT P r i n c i p l e s a n d t h e L e x Me r c a t o r i a " , i n : Ca r b o n n e a u ( e d . agreements we are dealing with here are generally of a commercial character, it is natural that we should take as our guidelines the UNIDROIT Principles.
Article 3.1(b) of the UNIDROIT Principles restricts their scope of application insofar as they do not deal with invalidity arising from immorality. In other words, this particular lex mercatoria is expressly silent on this generally a c c e p t e d l e g a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t c o me s c l o s e s t t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " . T h i s i s a r e f l e c t i o n , f i r s t , o f widespread unwillingness to incorporate moral aspects in the legal sphere and, second, of the realisation that standards of morality vary so widely the world over that it would be impossible to find a common denominator.
Nevertheless, Article 3.10 does provide for basic rules when there is a " g r o s s d i s p a ri t y " b e t we e n t h e d u t i e s o f t h e p a r t i e s , a s a result of which the contract can be cont e s t e d . T h i s r i g h t e x i s t s " i f , a t t h e t i me o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n of the contract, the contract term unjustifiably gave the other party an e x c e s s i v e a d v a n t a g e .
" T h e t e x t g o e s o n t o l i s t t h e f a c t o r s t h a t s h o u l d b e taken into conside r a t i o n : " t h e f a c t t h a t t h e o t h e r p a r t y h a s t a k e n u nfair a d v a n t a g e o f t h e f i r s t p a r t y ' s d e p e n d e n c e , e c o n o mi c d i s t r e s s o r u r g e n t
needs, or of its improvidence, ignorance, inexperience or lack of bargaining s k i l l " , a n d " t h e n a t u r e a n d p u rpose of the c o n t r a c t " .
It is not entirely certain, however, whether this approach can be develo p e d t o p r o d u c e a n o p e r a t i o n a l d o c t r i n e o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " . Gr o s s dispari t y t h o u g h t h e r e ma y i n d e e d b e b e t we e n t h e l e n d e r ' s d u t y a n d t h a t of the people of the borrowing State in many of the cases of interest here, there is unlikely to be much disparity between the lender and the representative of the borrowing State (in legal terms, the only ones relevant here).
Case groups
Ne v e r t h e l e s s , t h e a b o v e " lex mercatoria a p p r o a c h " c an be used in other ways. We can apply the methods described in Article 3.10 of the UNIDROIT Principles (involving the combination of various elements) to the quest i o n o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " . T h i s i s n o t u n u s u a l i n t e r ms o f l e g i s l a t i o n , a n d i s often encountered in the national standardisation of open offences such as the immorality of legal transactions. At first glance, this procedure might seem even less precise than the three conditions that make up the Canadian proposal, yet it has one advantage over the lack of precision displayed by the attempts made hitherto to give concrete shape to the d o c t r i n e o f " o d io u s d e b t s " :
T h e " o d i o u s n e s s " o f a d e b t i s n o t a u t o ma t i c , e v e n wh e r e t h e s a i d factual elements are present. Several facts must be seen in context before a decision is made in each individual case. In time, as more experience is gained, this procedure, which will initially have to be open by force of circumstance, can be more finely honed by establishing so-called case groups each of which will represent the outcome of the experience gained in specific cases so that individual cases can thereafter be identified as b e l o n g i n g t o a n a l r e a d y r e c o g n i s e d c a s e g r o u p o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " a n d t h e legal consequences become axiomatic. Thus, while early rulings will still be redolent of a degree of decisionism -since they will have to be handed down before any experience is gained and without the benefit of comparative material -they will gain in predictability and certainty in the longer run and lead to a coherent chain of decisions.
The merit of this procedure is that it does not force the (large) number of possible case constellations into a straight-jacket of predefined characteristics from the outset but rather ensures the necessary openness that allows account to be taken of the wide range of possible options. As each case is dealt with, however, experience will accumulate and the initial openness will then gradually be replaced by increasingly precise formulations, culminating in the establishment of case groups.
In terms of foreseeability and calculability for potential lenders, which we have emphasised at several junctures are extremely important, national experience with standards of this sort (in Germany we need only quote § 138 of the German Civil Code -BGB -(Immorality of Legal Transactions)) 22 indicates that this form of standards-setting is acceptable. And if the criteria for the assessment of each individual case are sufficiently clear, it is easier for lenders to anticipate the outcome than would be the case with definitions of factual elements, which in many ways are either too narrow or too broad, or indeed both.
Apart from the need (see D II(1)(c)(3)) to be able always to impute the " o d i o u s n e s s " t o b o t h s i d e s , wi t h n o e x c e p t i o n s -with the help of subjective prerequisites such as knowledge of the purpose to which the funds are to be put, or the fact that the lender should have had such knowledge -the following are the main criteria:
(a) B o r r o we r ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e For reasons of legal precision, this term must first be explained. For, while we oft e n s p e a k o f t h e " b o r r o we r " , t h i s i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h e c a s e s o f relevance here. The borrower is always the country in question, not the what we are aiming at here is to avoid turning moral issues or values into the sole criteria for assessment, so that in this context, too, the fundamental principles of international law already cited in the preceding Section will have to be taken on board, perhaps accompanied by any human rights Conventions to which the State from which the lender hails is a signatory. If, for instance, debts arise as a result of an unjustified war of aggression, at least one criterion of odiousness would be met. 26 (c) Purpose of the loan
Here, too, however, great caution is called for. The truism that there are two sides to every story applies here as well. We have already pointed out that arms purchases or the construction of prisons are not odious per se, just as the construction of schools and hospitals is not necessarily automatically a blessing for the people. However, the purpose of the loan will have to be assessed against provisions of international law in order to produce generally binding values-based yardsticks.
(d) General circumstances
Another criterion that requires more precise definition is the general circumstances under which the loan is granted. The high standards of international law norms need not necessarily be applied exclusively here; to fine-tune the identification of odiousness, other circumstances could also play a part, such as money laundering, co-operation with internationally wanted criminals (drugs dealers, etc.) or comparable factors.
Result
I n c o n c l u s i o n , t h e n , a d o c t r i n e o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " a p p e a r s t o b e l e g a l l y practicable if based on more precisely defined standard conditions than has been the case to date. This can be achieved by taking a step back from factual elements which lack detail and replacing them with an open f a c t u a l e l e me n t o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " wh i c h i s t h e n l i mi t e d wi t h t h e h e l p o f assessment factors that are as concrete as possible so as to establish case groups. If these are to gain general acceptance, the values-based yardsticks used must be stringent -they cannot be allowed to reflect only the ethical beliefs of one small group. If these factors are set in relation to one another, and if a debt is judged odious on this basis, we have yet to demonstrate that both parties involved are accountable, with the help of subjective criteria (knowledge on the part of the lender or the fact that the lender should have had this knowledge). If this proves to be the case, the legal consequences will follow of themselves.
E. -LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
This final, apparently banal statement conceals a problem. What should the legal conseq u e n c e s b e ? I f t h e g o a l o f t h e " o d i o u s d e b t s " d o c t r i n e i s t o liberate a State by law from its obligation to honour its debts provided they meet the terms of the doctrine, it is not really appropriate to declare the automatic nullity of the loan agreement or to bestow the right to repudiate the contract. For, if only the legal basis, i.e. the loan agreement itself, were declared null and void, the lender could then demand repayment at least of the amount granted as a loan on the grounds of unjust enrichment. Whether or not this would apply to the agreed interest is uncertain. We should also point out once again that a large number of loan agreements are likely to be null and void anyway since they contravene inter-State formalities.
I f we a r e t o a c h i e v e t h e d e c l a r e d g o a l o f t h e d o c t r i n e o f " o d i o u s d e b t s " , we mu s t n o t o n l y h a v e t h e l o a nagreement itself declared null and
void, but also preclude demands for repayment on the grounds of unjust enrichment. There is a parallel for this in civil law in almost all legal systems based on Roman law (i.e. stemming from late 19 th century Europe) in the form of a provision corresponding to the German Civil Code (BGB) § 817 27 according to which the lender is not entitled to repayment on the grounds of unjust enrichment if both borrower and lender can be accused of unethical behaviour, under certain circumstances. prejudice the establishment of case groups as proposed in this article. What is needed is a fairly permanent court or panel.
Under these circumstances, we are faced with only two options: either we use existing court institutions or we create a new body. As to the first of these options, we might look to the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) pursuant to Article III(3) of the Convention of 15 April 1994. 29 This body has already gathered a wealth of expertise in global legal disputes. This would be the preferred solution.
As to the second option, that of creating a new body, this would have to be done under the aegis of the United Nations 30 -perhaps UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) given the subject matter involved. Procedures could be based on those proposed by the IMF for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) to be implemented by a Dispute Resolution Forum (DRF). 31 Such a panel of judges would have exclusive power to decide on the relevant cases. The rules detailing the procedure could be established by the panel itself (thereby following the Iran-US Claims Tribunal model). However, it should be made perfectly clear from the outset that cases brought before the panel can only be initiated by a petition. A general duty to initiate would instead require a worldwide control system which (if national experience is anything to go by) is bound to be selective and thus inefficient. The resulting question -i.e., who should be given the right to file a petition, is a political one by definition.
The answer depends on what we are trying to achieve with this new legal principle: if only the parties to the loan contract were permitted to file a petition, more likely than not no proceeding will be initiated until after a change of government or political system intervenes, since it is hardly to be expected that either of the parties will have an interest in learning that the debt is odious unless such a political change occurs. By contrast, drawing the group of potential candidates for initiating proceedings too broadly (e.g., by also including NGOs), will foster a certain control mentality which would, in turn, result in a whole new set of problems. 
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In other words, what is needed is an appropriate way of guaranteeing access to the panel in cases of odious debts without imposing an unbearable control mechanism on the parties involved. 
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